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CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION BY AMENDMENT-A LOUISIANA
TRADITION
Constitutional revision in Louisiana, whether in conventions or
by amendment, has been sufficiently continuous to justify in-
cluding it with Mardi Gras, football, and corruption as one of
the premier components of state culture.'
Louisiana's first eight constitutions, all written during the 1800's, em-
bodied the values and goals of the prevailing political faction-invariably
composed of Louisiana's public elite. 2 By the late nineteenth century,
revision by constitutional amendment rather than costly convention had
become the preferred revision tactic.3 Indeed, since 1921 only one con-
stitutional convention has been held. From that constitutional convention
of 1973 (CC 73) emerged our present constitution which was ratified
by voters in 1974. Revision of the 1921 constitution by convention was
necessary because of the vast number of amendments voters had added
to that document. From 1922 until 1973 voters approved 536 amendments
making the 1921 constitution virtually incomprehensible.
Revision by amendment ostensibly leaves the ultimate power to
determine a state's governing structure with the people. Ideally, a state
constitution reflects the current values of the people and is responsive
to changes in those values. Such a result makes some degree of detail
in a constitution necessary. Also, the notion of leaving power with "the
people" sounds very democratic. On the other hand, critics of the
amendment process assert that it allows "a minority of interested voters
... [to take] advantage of the general lethargy of a disinterested and
uninformed electorate." 4
Conventional wisdom and voting trends tend to support both the
pros and cons of revision by amendment. State constitutions necessarily
contain detailed provisions to check the "otherwise plenary power of
state governments to do anything not expressly forbidden by the state
Copyright 1991, by LOUSIANA LAW REvmw.
I. Carleton, Elitism Sustained: The Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 54 Tul. L. Rev.
560 (1980).
2. See generally Carleton, supra note 1.
3. Id.
4. Carleton, supra note 1, at 564 (quoting Powell, A History of Louisiana Con-
stitutions in 1 Projet of a Constitution for the State of Louisiana 271, 503 (La. State
L. Inst. 1954)).
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constitutions or federal law." 5 At some point, however, excessive detail
like that found in the 1921 constitution makes the instrument incom-
prehensible even to lawyers and other professionals. Furthermore, the
merit of keeping control of the government with the people depends
upon the people's active participation in the process by voting and their
ability to make informed decisions when they vote.
Beginning with a cursory discussion of CC 73 and the present
constitution, this paper will then survey the amendments to the 1974
constitution focusing on the particular provisions to which the most
amendments have been made. Specifically, article VII dealing with Rev-
enue and Finance, article V concerning the judicial branch, article X
concerning Civil Service, and article VII dealing with education will
receive special attention. This paper will conclude with some thoughts
on what the voting trends say about constitutional revision by amend-
ment. Is it a good thing that this process is with the people or is the
criticism that the interested minority capitalizes on the apathy of the
disinterested majority true?
The 1974 Constitution
Although Louisiana's constitution is no longer the "political weapon" 6
it once was, the role played by interest groups in CC 73 ensures that
it remains to a large degree a political creation. Indeed, as one writer
noted, the constitution of 1974 was written under Edwin Edwards'
watchful eye "by a wide and self-interested assortment of assessors,
sheriffs, legislators, judges, lackeys and anyone who could get elected
or appointed." '7
The 1974 constitution, Louisiana's eleventh, is notably shorter than
its predecessor of 1921-the former having around 35,000 words, the
later consisting of more than 250,000 words.8 Even so, our constitution
remains considerably longer than those of our sister states. Moreover,
the brevity of our current constitution may not withstand the power of
Louisiana's voting public to amend its provisions.
The voluminous 1921 constitution originally contained only 40,200
words, with the excess coming from 536 amendments. 9 Since 1974, voters
have added forty-one out of sixty-six proposed amendments to the
5. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on State Con-
stitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, National Conference on Developments
in State Developments in State Constitutional Law 242 (1985).
6. See generally Carleton, supra note 1.
7. Maginnis, Too Many Amendments?, Gris Gris, September 1990, at 7, col. 1.
8. Public Affairs Research Council, Voter's Guide to the 1974 Proposed Constitution
1 (1974).
9. Id.
[Vol. 51
COMMENTS
constitution. As local political analyst John Maginnis wrote, "the Louis-
iana constitution has been amended more in less than two decades than
the sacred U. S. Constitution has in more than two centuries."' 0
Article VII-Revenue and Finance
The article of the constitution most often amended by voters has
been that of Revenue and Finance. Nearly half of the approved amend-
ments, eighteen of forty-one, were to article VII, and most related to
taxes and constitutional dedications. Increasingly voters have ratified
proposals which decrease the legislature's spending power through con-
stitutional dedications directly affecting either article VII or the natural
resource provision, article IX. Noting the trend for designating revenues
for particular programs or services, the Public Affairs Research Council
(PAR) projected the possibility of a self-executing budget that would
eliminate the need for legislative consideration and warned that contin-
uation of this trend would "deprive the Legislature of its most important
authority, the power of the purse, plus complicate the fiscal structure
and make it inflexible."" Given the large number of dedications and
other spending limitations in the constitution today, it seems that PAR's
projection is correct. An example of the problems associated with creating
such an inflexible structure can be seen in the early years of the Roemer
administration, when the legislature had to cut college budgets because
constitutional spending limits left few other places to cut.
In 1978, the first year of constitutional amendment since 1972, voters
dedicated revenues derived from the first use tax to establish a $500
million permanent trust fund.' 2 Voters later rejected an amendment to
repeal this dedication even though the Supreme Court declared the tax
unconstitutional in Maryland v. Louisiana.3 In this same year, 1982,
voters strayed from their trend, which began in 1978, of passing all
proposed amendments and passed only 4 of the 8 proposals. At first
blush this unwillingness to rubber stamp amendments indicates that voters
carefully considered the matters on which they were voting; however,
the fact that the voters left in a useless provision seems to indicate
otherwise.
True to the tradition of constitutional dedication, Louisianians in
1983 gave constitutional protection to the Louisiana Investment Fund
for Enhancement (LIFE fund) and dedicated oil and gas windfall money
for use in that fund. '4 The section created by this amendment has not
10. Maginnis, supra note 7.
11. Public Affairs Research Council, Voter's Guide: Nov. 21, 1987, at 2.
12. La. Const. art. IX, § 9.
13. 451 U.S. 725, 101 S. Ct. 2114 (1981).
14. La. Const. art. IX, § 10.
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yet been utilized due to the decline in oil and gas revenues, "but remains
in force and susceptible of being applied when oil and gas revenues to
the state exceed those collected in 1980-1981, after adjustment for in-
flation."' 5 The unfortunate crisis in the Persian Gulf and resulting
increase in the price of oil, however, could necessitate use of this
provision in the future.
Voters passed another revenue and finance related provision in 1983.
Efforts to reclaim property and mineral rights expropriated to construct
the Bohemia Spillway provided the foundation for this amendment which
allows the legislature to return public property to the prior owners when
the purpose for the expropriation no longer exists.16
Voters in 1984 uncharacteristically rejected a dedication of offshore
mineral revenue settlements to a "rainy day" fund to finance programs
designed to enhance economic development. 7 The relatively high per-
centage of voters in 1984 voting on the proposed amendments, 53.7%
of those registered, rejected all five proposals. Also, the proposed "rainy
day" fund was fraught with numerous "constitutional, substantive and
technical problems" despite its noble objectives.' One might therefore
conclude that voter rejection of this amendment stemmed from voter
awareness of the proposal's infirmities.
In 1990, however, voters passed a similar amendment.' 9 This pro-
vision established a Revenue Stabilization/Mineral Trust Fund to receive
severance tax, royalty and bonus revenue above $750 million a year and
any revenue above that $750 million needed to finance appropriations
within the spending limit set by the amendment. Also, the amendment
requires that the "governor's proposed state budget be based on existing
revenue sources and be within the spending limit."20 By 1990, voters
surely had their fill of wasteful state spending. Federal deregulation of
the price of oil created a $2 billion windfall in the early 1980's all of
which was spent. 2'
Earlier, in 1986, voters evidenced their commitment to education
and their belief that the legislature could not be trusted to adequately
and prudently fund that commitment. The electorate dedicated to a
permanent education trust fund (the 8(g) fund) settlement proceeds from
a long-standing offshore oil dispute between the state and the federal
government. 22 Interest from money placed in this fund is divided between
15. L. Hargrave, The Louisiana State Constitution 163 (1990).
16. La. Const. art. VII, § 14(B).
17. 1984 La. Acts No. 963.
18. Public Affairs Research Council, Voter's Guide: Nov. 6, 1984, at 4.
19. La. Const. arts. VII, §§ 10, 10.3, 11.
20. Public Affairs Research Council, Voter's Guide: October 6, 1990, at 2.
21. Id.
22. La. Const. art. VII, § 10.1.
[Vol. 51
COMMENTS
the Board of Elementary and Secondary Education (BESE) and the
Board of Regents. The Board of Regents makes appropriations for
endowed chairs and research at the higher education level. Since 1986,
$10.4 million has been awarded by the Board for twenty-six endowed
chairs for eminent scholars at Louisiana's public and private higher
education institutions. 23
Voters initially rejected in 1989, but later passed in 1990, a measure
requiring that the legislature regulate 8(g) fund spending for BESE's
and the Board of Regents' administrative costs and forbidding the sub-
stitution of BESE's share of 8(g) money for general fund appropria-
tions.24
In 1987, voters approved more restrictions on the legislature's spend-
ing power by giving constitutional protection to the statutory Louisiana
Wildlife and Fisheries Conservation Fund2 and by requiring sound fund-
ing of the public employee retirement system. 26
Other dedications have involved giving a larger share of severance
taxes to the producing parish. In 1990, voters again passed a previously
rejected amendment to dedicate one-third of the lignite tax to the pro-
ducing parish, currently Red River and DeSoto parishes. 27
During 1989, voters rejected in April, then ratified in October, two
more limitations on the legislature's purse power. One amendment cre-
ated a Transportation Fund to receive revenue from the increased gas-
oline/motor fuel tax which went from sixteen to twenty cents a gallon. 28
This amendment was tied to another approved amendment which in-
creased the constitutionally-frozen $3 auto license fee. 29 The $3 fee,
constitutionally mandated since 1940, symbolized the constitutional con-
vention delegates' reluctance to change. Moreover, Louisiana's fee was
far below the average U. S. auto license tax which was $34.83 in 1988.30
The amendment, however, placed a ceiling on the tax and required that
the revenue be used for highway transportation-related purposes. A
similar amendment failed in 1986, probably because it contained neither
a provision restricting the legislature's ability to spend the increased
revenues nor a provision placing a ceiling on the amount of the increase.
Not only do voters distrust the legislature when it comes to spending
money, voting patterns indicate that they certainly do not trust the
legislature's use of its power to raise money, i.e., to tax. Property taxes
23. C. Coltharp, Memo: Louisiana Board of Regents (Oct. 26, 1990).
24. La. Const. art. VII, § 10.1(C).
25. La. Const. art. VII, § 10(A).
26. La. Const. art. X, § 29(E).
27. La. Const. art. VII, § 4(D).
28. La. Const. art. VII, § 5.
29. La. Const. art. VII, § 5.
30. Public Affairs Research Council, Voter's Guide: Oct. 1989, at 10.
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and the homestead exemption are recurring issues on proposed amend-
ment ballots. Property taxation in Louisiana is a much-debated topic
generally, and no group-convention delegates, legislators, or voters-
has done much to clear up this area.3
In 1979, voters approved a measure creating a new classification
for assessing public service property. 2 Public service properties include
oil and gas pipelines; electric, gas and telephone utility companies; and
railroads and other common carriers. The 1974 constitution provided
that land and residential improvements were to be assessed at 10% and
other property at 15%. Essentially this amendment legalized the method
used by the tax commission in 1978 to reappraise public service property.
Facing the prospect of a 40% decline in revenues using the legally
mandated fair market value approach, the commission opted for a
method of reappraisement that kept assessments at or near their prior
level. 3 Because electric co-ops retain the 15% level, out of state con-
sumers bear most of the increased assessment via their use of common
carriers and pipelines. Even though one cannot conclusively decide that
voters are truly informed about all the ramifications of their decisions
in the voting booth, one cannot deny that voters know enough to act
in their own best interest.
In 1980, the largest voter turnout since passage of the 1974 con-
stitution, 55.7%, unsurprisingly increased the homestead exemption from
$5,000 to $7,000 in anticipation of the constitutionally-required 1982
value reassessment. 34 Related to this measure was an amendment voters
passed mandating that property tax millages be adjusted at each reap-
praisal and permitting taxing authorities to restore rolled back millages
without voter approval.35 These two measures taken together have meant
that taxes rise considerably less than property values would indicate
during reappraisal years; however, tax rates are adjusted at each re-
appraisal interval in the hope that tax dollars will be adequate to cover
local governments' operating costs.3 6
Voters in 1982 accepted proposals to: 1) freeze property assessments
for five years to encourage the development of historic or economic
districts, 2) exempt from taxation electric utility fuel inventories,3" and
3) exempt from taxation coal and lignite stored for industrial uses.3 9
31. See Carleton, supra note 1.
32. La. Const. art. VII, § 18(B).
33. Public Affairs Research Council, Voter's Guide: October 27, 1979, at 39-40.
34. La. Const. art. VII, § 20(A).
35. La. Const. art. VII, § 23.
36. Public Affairs Research Council, Voter's Guide: Nov. 4, 1980.
37. La. Const. art. VII, § 21(G).
38. La. Const. art. VII, § 21(C).
39. La. Const. art. VII, § 21(G).
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The oil crisis of the late 1970's provided the major impetus for the last
two amendments. The federal Fuel Use Act of 1978 forced many in-
dustries to utilize coal or lignite as fuel by forbidding the construction
of new oil or gas-fueled boilers. Providing property tax exemptions for
fuel stockpiles enabled natural gas-dependant Louisiana industries to off-
set, to some extent, the substantial conversion costs resulting from the
switch to other fuels."°
Other measures affecting article VII have included: 1) an amendment
allowing colleges and universities to acquire stock with the fruits of their
labor, i.e., research/intellectual property, 4' 2) an amendment prohibiting
local governments from levying inheritance taxes, 42 3) an amendment
exempting from taxation property leased to non-profit corporations to
house the homeless, 43 and 4) an amendment allowing New Orleans to
levy up to ten mills in property taxes.
Article V-The Judicial Branch
Although many reforms were needed in the judicial branch when
delegates revised the constitution in 1973, few meaningful changes were
made." Voters, however, have instituted some changes by amendment.
Specifically, in 1980 voters ratified an amendment giving appellate ju-
risdiction to the supreme court for direct appeal of death penalty cases
with all other criminal appeals going to the circuit courts of appeal. 45
The amendment became necessary because the supreme court had become
overrun with routine criminal appeals that consumed much of the jus-
tices' time.
In 1979, voters amended article V, section 19 to clarify the instances
in which a juvenile may be tried as an adult and to authorize legislative
enlargement of the list of offenses."
Ostensibly in an attempt to save money and increase voter partic-
ipation, the 1983 legislature proposed and the people approved a measure
allowing 12 months, instead of 6 months, in which to hold special
elections to fill judgeship vacancies. 47 Four years later, in 1987, voters
approved a previously rejected amendment giving the state supreme court
sole authority to provide for the appointment of attorneys as temporary
or ad hoc judges of city, municipal, traffic, parish, juvenile, or family
40. See generally Public Affairs Research Council, Voter's Guide (1982).
41. La. Const. art. VII, § 14(B).
42. La. Const. art. VII, § 4(C)).
43. La. Const. art. VII, § 21(B)(1)).
44. See L. Hargrave, supra note 15, at 2n.
45. La. Const. art. V, § 5.
46. La. Const. art. V, § 19.
47. La. Const. art. V, § 22(B).
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courts.4 This amendment eliminated concern over the constitutionality
of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 158 which allowed the
legislature to appoint temporary judges, even though the constitution
prior to this amendment required that all judges be elected.
In 1990, the people approved a measure assuring the continued use
of administrative hearing officers to resolve disputed workers' compen-
sation claims.4 9
Two amendments that failed in 1989 would have affected Louisiana's
current state judicial election scheme. The at-large election scheme in
place today has been attacked as a violation of the federal Voting Rights
Act.50 Two separate suits, Chisom v. Roemer" and Clark v. Roemer,"
prompted the proposed amendments. One amendment related to the
election of supreme court justices. The other amendment would have
created more opportunities for blacks to elect black judges by creating
subdistricts where a majority of the population would be black.
In Chisom, petitioner argued that Louisiana's present system for
electing supreme court justices dilutes black voting strength. The amend-
ment would have given the New Orleans metropolitan parishes three of
the eight justices until 1998, with one justice elected to a ten year term
in 1998 and two elected during the 1990 Congressional election. A federal
district court in New Orleans dismissed the suit on the grounds that
the Voting Rights Act does not apply to judges. The Fifth Circuit,
however, reversed the decision" and the United States Supreme Court
rejected an appeal. The court based its ruling on the distinction between
trial judges and supreme court justices. Unlike a supreme court justice,
according to the court, a trial judge holds a single-member office which
is not subject to the dilution concerns associated with electing "repre-
sentatives of the people.' '1 4
The petitioner in Clark complained that the present system for
electing district and court of appeal judges prevents blacks from being
elected. Although the court found the judicial districts in violation of
the Voting Rights Act, the court withheld a remedy to give the legislature
a chance to correct the problem.
In 1990 the Fifth Circuit again addressed the applicability of the
Voting Rights Act to judges in LULAC v. Clements." In that decision,
48. La. Const. art. V, § 5(A).
49. La. Const. art. V, §§ 10(A), (B), 16(A).
50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974e (1989); PAR, Voter's Guide (1989).
51. 917 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, (U.S. Jan. 18, 1991) (1990 WL
193313).
52. 750 F. Supp. 200 (1990).
53. 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1988).
54. Latin American Citizens Council (LULAC) v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620, 623 (5th
Cir. 1990) (explaining Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1988)).
55. 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990).
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the court held that the Act does not apply to the election of judges
thus overruling Chisom.
The amendments may have failed, but the saga of Louisiana's elec-
tion system continues. On November 2, 1990, the United States Supreme
Court blocked the state's November 6 and December 8 judicial elections
in districts that did not have the federal approval required by the Voting
Rights Act. Thus, the current constitutional provision for the judiciary
has many problems that have not and probably should not be remedied
through the amendment process.
Article X-Public Officials and Employees
The already detailed provisions of article X, which regulate public
officials and employees, have become more complex by amendment since
1974. The revised 1974 constitution added to this article a provision
that a seat on the Civil Service Commission (CSC) be filled by a person
elected by classified employees.56 This trend toward giving more control
over the CSC to the employees has been continued in the amendments
to this provision.
Presidents of private colleges and universities nominate candidates
from which the governor may choose CSC members to ensure that
appointments are as free from political bias as possible. This practice
is also followed by the New Orleans Civil Service Commission; however,
in 1984 one of the nominating colleges, St. Mary's Dominican College,
closed. Voters rejected a 1984 amendment naming Our Lady of Holy
Cross College to replace St. Mary's and a 1985 amendment naming both
the University of New Orleans and Southern University in New Orleans
as replacements. In 1987 voters finally passed an amendment "allow[ing]
the seat to be filled from nominees elected by the [city's] classified
employees." ' 7 Another indication that state employees are getting more
control of their system is the passage of a 1987 amendment requiring
actuarially sound funding of the retirement fund.58
In 1982, voters amended sections 8 and 12 of article X to authorize
the CSC to allow referees to decide appeals by state employees contesting
their firing or other disciplinary action. 9 Prior to the amendment the
CSC clearly had the power to appoint referees to take testimony. The
referees, however, did more than just take testimony: they prepared
recommended findings of fact and wrote proposed opinions for the
CSC.60 The legislature proposed the amendment to nullify the effect of
56. La. Const. art. X, § 3(C).
57. L. Hargrave, supra note 15, at 168.
58. La. Const. art. X, § 29(E); see also L. Hargrave, supra note 15.
59. La. Const. art. X, §§ 8, 12.
60. Public Affairs Research Council, Voter's Guide: Sept. 11, 1982, at 7.
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a state appellate court decision which had declared that the referee's de
facto functions violated the constitution.6'
Among the fourteen out of fifteen proposals ratified by voters in
1990 were two amendments concerning the CSC. First, voters added to
article X a section which establishes a separate CSC for state police. 62
Second, a related amendment removes the legislature's authority to pro-
vide supplemental pay to Wildlife and Fisheries enforcement officers. 3
Article VIII-Education
The fact that improving Louisiana's education system is important
to the voting public is embodied in the constitutional dedication in article
VIII of 8(g) funds to an education trust fund." Direct amendments to
this article, however, have been few in number.
In a professed effort to make BESE members more accountable
and visible to the public, voters changed members' terms from six-year
staggered terms to four-year terms concurrent with those of the governor
and the state superintendent of education. 61 Proponents of this measure
stated that "[clhanging from the relatively low voter turnout at con-
gressional elections to the more visible gubanatorial election time [would]
heighten voter interest in these important positions, and permit a better
dialogue on education issues between candidates for BESE and other
statewide offices." Average voter participation in 1983, a gubanatorial
election year, was 44.2%, a relatively high turnout; however, in another
election year, 1988, only 22.7% voted. Therefore, one must wonder if
the amendment has really enlivened debate on educational issues and
increased BESE-member accountability. Moreover, Louisiana State Uni-
versity Law Professor Lee Hargrave notes in his treatise that this amend-
ment undermines the attempt of CC 73 delegates "to ensure the board's
independence from the governor by providing for six-year overlapping
terms." 67
That constitutional amendment by the state's voting populace is one
means of checking legislative power is evidenced by voter approval of
a 1987 amendment giving BESE, rather than the legislature, power to
decide the components and objectives of the minimum foundation pro-
gram.6 1 Educators successfully urged this amendment in anticipation of
61. Id.
62. La. Const. art. X, §§ I(A), 1O(A)(1), part IV.
63. La. Const. art. X, § 1O(A)(1).
64. See supra text accompanying notes 22 and 23.
65. La. Const. art. VIII, §§ 3(B), 15.
66. Public Affairs Research Council, Voter's Guide: Nov. 1979, at 43.
67. L. Hargrave, supra note 15, at 147.
68. La. Const. art. VIII, § 13(B).
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the Louisiana Supreme Court decision in Louisiana Association of Ed-
ucators v. Edwards where the court held that the constitutional mandate
that the legislature appropriate funds for the program was unenforceable
by court order.6 9 In the most recent amendment to article VIII, voters
on the October 1989 ballot approved a measure creating a voting student
board position for all boards of higher education.70
Other Amendments
Although revenue and finance provisions have been amended the
most, other provisions have not completely escaped the attention on
legislators and voters. Most recently in 1990, the question of whether
Louisianians want a state lottery finally came before the public. Despite
adamant opposition based mainly on moral and religious conviction,
voters answered "yes." ' 7 1 Creation of the lottery is a prime example of
how constitutional amendments operate to make the constitution reflect
changes in the values of the population.
Another reflection of strong public sentiment can be found in passage
of the 1989 amendment relating to drug seizure. 72 This amendment
changes the forfeiture of contraband from a quasi-criminal to a civil
proceeding and reduces the burden of proof on the state to the pre-
ponderance standard. Thus, the amendment permits "forfeiture without
a criminal conviction if the state [can] show probable cause for forfeiture
and the owner [cannot] prove his innocence." 73
In 1990, voters also approved an amendment mandating that the
regular legislative session begin 21 days earlier than in prior years.7 4 In
the past, sessions began on the third Monday in April. This date,
however, caused payroll problems because the legislature was in session
at the end of the fiscal year, July 1.
CONCLUSION
Considering the voting patterns of Louisiana's voting public, one
can see that financing the state is a major concern of the people. Given
the large number of dedications and other spending limits, it is also
obvious that the public does not trust the legislature to wisely spend
revenues. This distrust may, however, lead to a constitution just as
incomprehensible and inflexible as the 1921 constitution. Since people
do not trust the representatives they have chosen, and their history of
69. 521 So. 2d 390 (La. 1988).
70. La. Const. art. VIII, § 8(B).
71. La. Const. art. XII, § 6.
72. La. Const. art. I, § 4.
73. Public Affairs Research Council, Voter's Guide: Oct. 7, 1989, at 5.
74. La. Const. art. III, § 2(A).
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unwise spending seems to justify the people's concerns, then maybe the
more appropriate remedy is to elect new officials rather than amend
the constitution. 75
Another area where revision other than by amendment may be
appropriate is where the judiciary branch is concerned. The current
battle over the validity of Louisiana's election scheme under federal law
shows that something more than piecemeal amendment of the consti-
tution is required to reform that provision of the constitution.
For better or worse, our constitution does seem to reflect the current
values of the people. For the better, the people created an education
trust fund in an effort make desperately needed changes in Louisiana's
educational system. Another indication of current values is seen in the
passage of a state-wide lottery. One can also glean from the passed
amendments to the constitution the fact that state workers want and
are gaining more control of their system. Possibly for the worse is the
public's attitude toward property taxes. Rather than homeowners bearing
a fair share of the tax burden, consumers pay the most in sales taxes,
increased utility costs, and increased rent. Some even attribute to Louis-
iana's property tax scheme much of the blame for the state's lagging
economic growth.
That voters are often disinterested or just apathetic is shown by
low voter turnout-from a low of 24.9% in September of 1982 to a
high of 55.70o in November of 1980. These numbers also lend support
to the criticism that revision by amendment allows the few interested
voters to capitalize on voter apathy. Furthermore, the fact that many
previously rejected amendments are ratified the second or third time
around tends to show that voters are neither adequately informed about
the issues nor are they carefully considering the effects of their decisions.
Z. Melissa Lawrence
75. During the 1991 legislative session, Governor Roemer will urge the legislature to
propose to the voters an amendment limiting the terms of elected officials.
[Vol. 51
